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Freedom of Religion-"THERE Is No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CHOOSE
To Dm'-John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston
The practice of one's religious beliefs has generally been freely allowed
in the United States so long as it does not infringe upon the constitutionally
protected rights of others.' However, in the recent case of John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hospital v. Heston,2 the New Jersey Supreme Court seemingly
has modified this principle by justifying the restraint of an individual in
the practice of his religious beliefs, not to preserve the constitutional rights
of others, but to protect that individual from himself.
In the Heston case the appellant was an unmarried twenty-two year
old female who had suffered a ruptured spleen in an automobile accident.
Hospital personnel determined that an operation was required to save her
life, necessarily including the transfusion of whole blood, but the patient,
a Jehovah's Witness, refused to give her consent to the blood transfusion. 3
Death being imminent, a guardian with authority to consent to a blood
transfusion was appointed by a court at the hospital's request, and successful
surgery was performed. Upon her recovery, the patient moved to have
the court's order vacated. Although the question was conceded to be
moot,4 the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the lower court's order
1 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Reynolds v. United States, 98 US. 145
(1878). See generally 16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 340 (1964).
2 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
8 Both of the appellant's parents were also Jehovah's Witnesses. According to the
interpretation of the Jehovah's Witness, the Bible makes the injection of blood into the
body a violation of the commands of God. For example, Acts 15:29 states:
[Aibstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled,
and from fornication: from which if ye keep yourselves ye shall do well.
Leviticus 17:10:
As for any man of the house of Israel or some alien resident who is residing as
an alien in your midst who eats blood, I shall certainly set my face against the
soul that is eating the blood, and I shall indeed cut him off from among his
people.
Thus the Jehovah's Witneses believe that a blood transfusion is synonymous with
eating blood which is directly prohibited by Genesis 9:4, which recites: "But flesh
with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat."
The appellants mother refused to give her consent to the blood transfusion and her
father could not be found. The appellant insisted that she also had expressed her
refusal of the blood transfusion, although the evidence indicated that she had been
delerious at the time. Nevertheless, the court in reaching its decision treated the ap-
pellant as competent at the time she allegedly refused the blood transfusion.
4 Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1185 (1941). By the great weight of authority, an appellate
court may render an opinion on a moot subject if it is within the public interest.
See Note, Cases Moot on Appeal: A Limit on the judicial Power, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
772 (1955).
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authorizing the appointment of a guardian and held that even though a
blood transfusion was contrary to appellant's religious beliefs, "there is no
constitutional right to choose to die." 5
It has generally been held that the state may order medical treatment for
children where the parents refuse to give their consent for religious reasons.8
The state may also require an adult to submit to medical treatment for con-
tagious diseases.7 A few cases have even required an adult to submit to
medical treatment, contrary to his religious beliefs, although there was
present no threat of contagious disease.8 The courts in these cases have
5 John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 NJ. 576, 279 A.2d 670, 672 (1971).6 See, e.g., Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 IM. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1952). See gen-
erally Annot, 30 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1953). Generally, the courts have employed two lines
of reasoning in holding that a child may be compelled to submit to medical treatment
over the parents' objections. One view, exemplified by the authority cited above,
subscribes that the refusal of parents to give their consent to life-saving medical treat-
ment for their child based on religious grounds, amounts to neglect, and by statute,
the state may appoint a guardian who has the power to authorize medical treatment
for a neglected dependent child. The other view invokes the doctrine of parens patriae
and has been defined in Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955) as:
[A] right of sovereignty [which] imposes a duty on the sovereignty to protect
the public interest and to protect such persons with disabilities who have no
rightful protector...
... [It] extends to the personal liberty of persons who are under a disability
whether by reasons of infancy, incompetency, habitual drunkenness, imbecility, etc.
• . . This jurisdiction and duty is called into play when it is found that such
persons could be a danger to themselves or to the public if they were not taken
and held under the protective custody of the sovereign. Id. at 425, 114 A.2d at 5.
See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
8 Compare Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), with United States v. George,
239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center,
49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 NJ. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 US. 985 (1964).
But see In re Estate of Brooks, 32 IM. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Er'jckson v.
Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See generally Annot., 9
A.L.R.3d 1391 (1966).
Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964) is the leading case in this area. The patient was the mother of a seven-
-month-old child and therefore, since the patient owed a duty to the community to care
for her child, the state had an interest in preserving the life of this mother. In United
States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) the court ordered a blood trans-
fusion for a father of four saying that doctors cannot be required to ignore the man-
dates of their own consciences under these circumstances. The court in Powell v.
Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct.
1965) invoked no theory of law, but emotionally declared that since this mother of six
wanted to live, she could not be allowed to die. The problem of whether a competent
adult may refuse a blood transfusion was faced by the court in Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964). The court found that
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relied primarily on the reasoning that as a parent, the patient owes a duty.
to society to care for his children, and therefore, society's interest in main-
taining the patient's life so that he may care for his children outweighs the
patient's interest in his religious convictions. 9 The Heston case marks a
further erosion of religious freedom in this area by eliminating the family
responsibility requirement and holding that even an unmarried adult, having
no children, can be ordered to submit to life-saving medical treatment re-
gardless of his contrary religious convictions.
The Heston court based its holding that "there is no constitutional right
to choose to die" on two lines of reasoning.1° First, the court considered
the unfairness of possible civil and criminal liability confronting the hospital
and its staff;'1 second, it considered and weighed the state's interest in an
individual's life against the individual's right to freedom of religion. The
primary impact of the decision may be found in the latter consideration.
Drawing a direct analogy to decisions involving suicide, the court theo-
rized that since the state had an interest in life in the case of suicide, it neces-
sarily had an interest in the life of one who refuses life-saving medical treat-
ment. Closer analysis exposes marked weaknesses in the court's analogy.
Suicide as well as attempted suicide were crimes at common law, but today
neither is universally held to be illegal.' 2 Furthermore, there has been no
the life of the pregnant mother and her baby were so intertwined and inseparable that
to attempt to distinguish between them would be impracticable.
Two cases have reached an opposite result from that of the above decisions. In In re
Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) the court refused to order a
blood transfusion for an adult holding that there was no "clear and present danger"
which warranted the interference with the patient's religious rights. Similarly in
Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962) the ultimate right
of the patient to have the final say in a medical decision was cited as the controlling
factor in declining to order a blood transfusion for an adult.
9 See United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); Application of
President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537
(1964); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267
N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
10John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
[W]e find that the interest of the hospital and its staff, as well as the State's in-
terest in life, warranted the transfusion of blood under the circumstances of this
case. Id. at 580, 279 A.2d at 674.
11 See generally 33 FORDHAM L. REv. 513 (1965) for a discussion of possible civil and
criminal liability facing a hospital and its staff when a patient refuses medical treat-
ment after placing himself in their care.
12 See W. Clark & W. Marshall, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMEs 557 (6th ed.
1958):
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'case which has tested'the validity of a statute punishing suicide or attempted
suicide.'3 Suicide has been defined as the "voluntary and intentional de-
struction of his own life by a person of sound mind." 14 The essence of
the offense is the intent, and this presupposes that the requisite mental ca-
pacity is also present.15 Even if suicide is a crime which may be prevented
by the state through the use of its police powers, it is highly speculative to
assume that a patient who refuses a blood transfusion intends to commit
suicide.16 The Heston court adopted the view that to refuse medical treat-
ment knowing that such treatment will save life implies a willingness to
die.17 Rather, it would seem that a patient who relies on faith and prayer
for his own cure does not will to die, but only desires to get well through
the use of an alternate remedy.'3 Therefore, such a tenuous relationship
Self-destruction is a form of homicide, and a felony under English Comm6n
Law.
The lands and goods of the offender were forfeited to the king, as in the case
of other felonies, and his body was ignominiously buried in the highway.
The attitude towards suicide at common law was probably best expressed in 4
W. BLAcKsroNE, CoiErmrrARiEs *189-90.
[T]he law of England wisely and religiously considers that no man hath a power
to destroy life but by permission from God, the author of it; and as the suicide
is guilty of a double offense, one spiritual in invading the prerogative of the
Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for; the other
temporal, against the King, who hath an interest in the preservation of all his
subtects, the law has therefore ranked this among the highest crimes, making it
a species of felony, a felony committed on oneself.
An attempt to commit suicide was also unlawful and a crime at common law. Com-
monwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1877). See, e.g., State v. LaFayette, 117 N.J.L.
442, 188 A. 918 (C.P. Camden County 1937); State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E,2d
854 (1961) (upholding convictions for attempted suicide). Attempted suicide is an
illegal act by statute in at least seven states today. NEv. REv. STAT. § 202. 495 (1957);
N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A: 170-25.6 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. PEN. LAw, § 2305 (1960); ND.
CENr. CoDE § 12-33-02 (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 812 (1961); S.D. CoDE § 13.1903
(1939); WAsH. REv. CoDn § 9.80.020 (1961). But see Wallace v. State 232 Ind. 700,
116 N.E.2d 100 (1953); Pennsylvania v. Wright, 26 Pa. County Ct. 666 (1902) (holding
suicide is not a crime). See also Schulman, Suicide and Suicide Prevention: A Legal
Analysis, 54 A.B.A.J. 855, 858-59 (1968).
13 See Schulman, Suicide and Suicide Prevention: A Legal Analysis, 54 A.B.A.J. 855,
862 (1968).
14 Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 194 So. 421, 422, 424 (Ala. 1940).
1 5 See Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N.Y. 398, 400, 67 N.E. 83, 85 (1903).
16 See 33 FoDHAm L. REv. 513 (1965).
17 The court believed that the distinction between actively and passively seeking
death was merely verbal. 58 N.J. at 578-79, 279 A.2d at 672-73. The justification for
this would seem to lie in the prospect that:
Although the adherents of this religion might not technically "wish to die" in
the literal sense, they do refuse medical treatment which they know will prevent
death, and implicit in that refusal is a willingness to die.
Comment, The Right to Die, 7 HousToN L. REv. 654, 664-65 (1970).
18 See Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Whether
-1 9721.' ' 415
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as exists between suicide and the refusal of life-saving medical treatment
should not support a conclusion that the state has an interest in the life of
one who refuses the treatment.19
Even assuming that the state has such an interest in the life of an indi-
vidual, this interest standing alone should not rise above the individual's first
amendment right to freedom of religion.20 In exploring the question whether
one has a right to die, it is noteworthy that the free exercise of religion has
been used previously as a basis for the affirmative resolution of that dilem-
ma.21 Although the freedom of religious belief is absolute, the freedom to
exercise that belief is not absolute and therefore does not justify acts which
run contrary to the law. 22 Certain guidelines have been established in order
to determine when state interference may be justified. The Heston court
adopted the "compelling state interest" test which provides that a first
amendment freedom may be limited only if such restriction is justified by
a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate." 23
or not death will result from the refusal of a blood transfusion is a question of medical
judgment. Therefore, the patient is merely exercising his ultimate right to choose among
alternate remedies and not suicide.
[Clould the ill adult who relied on faith and prayer for his own cure be found
to entertain the criminal intent required to make up the crime of attempted
suicide? I think not, for his only intent was to get well.
Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MiN. L. REv. 48, 69 (1954).
19 The Heston court's argument, at this point, is founded on the right of the state
to intervene to prevent crime under its police powers. If the mere refusing of medical
treatment is not a crime, then the state should not be justified in interfering with the
patient's religious conduct.
20 Cf. Gitlow v. People, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The first amendment freedoms are
protected from abridgement by the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.21 See Comment, The Right to Die, 7 HousroN L. REv. 654, 662 (1970).
22 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). However, the Reynolds Court
did not establish sufficient guidelines as to which actions would justify state inter-
ference and which would not. In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 (1943), the Court asseverated that first amendment freedoms can be re-
stricted "only to protect grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may
lawfully protect."
23 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). One such guideline which was re-
jected by the Heston court, directs that a state may interfere with a claimed religious
freedom when it is shown that such interference is necessary for or conducive to the
protection of society from some "clear and present danger." Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also Note, The Clear and Present Danger Standard: Its
Present Viabi!ity, 6 U. RicH. L. RFv. 93 (1971).
Although the "clear and present danger" test was rejected by the Heston court, the
court in In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965), a factually
similar case, held that there was no "clear and present danger" which warranted inter-
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In order for a state to limit an individual in his religious activities, two
-conditions must be met under the state interest test. First, there must be
at least a rational relationship between the religious conduct and the state
interest.24 The dubious relationship of the denial of medical treatment to
attempted suicide and its criminal connection does not demonstrate any
rational relationship to a state interest where a single adult individual is
involved. Second, there must be a grave abuse by this religious activity
which endangers paramount interests.25 In order to have met this second
requisite, the Heston court would have had to establish that the refusal of
life-saving medical treatment was immoral conduct, thereby justifying state
regulation to prevent possible detriment to the morals and welfare of so-
ciety.26 It is questionable whether this type of activity is immoral, and it
also would seem difficult to prove that such conduct would be detrimental
to the morals and welfare of society.27
In support of its conclusion that the state has an overriding interest in
the life of an individual, the Heston court relied on cases which have upheld
the constitutionality of state statutes requiring motorcyclists to wear hel-
mets. 28 It should be observed however that those cases have been unwilling
to hold that the state's interest in protecting individuals is sufficient by itself
to establish the constitutionality of the statute. Rather, the decisions have
attempted to tie in the general welfare of the public in order to establish
ference by the State in the patient's conduct. For a criticism of the employment of this
test see 44 TExAs L. REv. 190 (1965).
The snake-handling cases appear to present the same issue as the blood transfusion
cases, but were decided prior to the formulation of the "compelling state interest" test.
See, e.g., Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 623, 88 So. 2d 880, cert. denied, 264 Ala. 697, 88
So. 2d 887 (1956); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942);
State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179 (1949); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17,
216 S.W.2d 708 (1948). In these cases, the constitutionality of state statutes prohibiting
the use of snakes by religious sects in their ceremonies was upheld because the state
has a right to protect the lives, health, and safety of its citizens.24 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
25 Id.
26 See 44 TEXAs L. Rnv. 190, 194 (1965).
While taking one's own life is condemned under Judeo-Christian moral codes,
there is some question as to the immorality of committing passive suicide by
refusing necessary medical treatment. Even if passive suicide was considered
immoral per se, it is doubtful if state interference could be justified on this
basis alone. Where the state seeks to regulate "immoral conduct," the justifica-
tion is usually in terms of the resulting detriment to the morals and welfare
of society. That passive suicide has such an effect would be difficult to prove.
27 Id.
28See State v. Krammes, 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252 A.2d 223 (App. Div.), cert. denied,
54 N.J. 257, 254 A.2d 800 (1969); State v. Mele, 103 N.J. Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176
(Hudson County Ct. 1968).
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firmly the statute's constitutionality.29 The inference is clear that the state
does not have a sufficient interest in the individual's safety to limit his
personal freedom if its exercise does not affect the welfare of others.
It is submitted that the Heston decision threatens to restrict unreasonably
religious freedom in this country. One should have the right to die, or at
least the right to select his own medicine, as long as his actions do not inter-
fere with the rights of others. A paramount state interest in the individual
should exist only where the actions of that individual cease to coexist with
the freedom of others. John Stuart Mill, a proponent of social functionalism,
asserted what should be the governing principle:
'[T] he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or col-
lectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their num-
ber, is self-protection. That the only purpose which power can be
rightfully exercised over any number of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical
or moral is not sufficient warrant.30
29 Compare Commonwealth V. Howie, 238 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1968) 'with State v.
Krammes, 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252 A.2d 223 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 54 N.J. 257,
254 A.2d 800 (1969) and State v. Mele, 103 N.J. Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176 (Hudson
County Ct. 1968) and People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Buffalo
City Ct. 1967). But see American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1968).
The court in People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S. 2d 797 (Buffalo City
Ct. 1967), summed up what seems to be the consensus of those courts which have
upheld the constitutionality of statutes requiring motorcyclists to wear protective
helmets:
It has long .been recognized that the power to regulate and control the use
of the public roads and highways is primarily the exclusive prerogative of
the states. As a corollary of this power the state may control or restrict the
type of motor vehicles which use the public roads .... Pursuant to this power
it would seem only reasonable that the state have the right to reasonably regu-
late how riders and passengers of vehicles susceptible to special dangers and
risks should protect themselves on public property. However, there is another,
and perhaps more important reason, for believing the law in question to be
constitutional. I believe that there is in fact a real danger to other citizens
when a motorcyclist fails to use protective helmets. And if this is so there
is no doubt of the state's right to regulate regardless of what definition of
"police power" one uses. Id. at 469, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
,The courts have taken judicial notice that a motorcyclist without a protective helmet
can be a hazard to other users of the highway. However, in Anzerican Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968), the court could see no
possible danger to other users of the highway and concluded that the statute was
unconstitutional. It is interesting to note that the court, in rejecting the Attorney
General's contention that "the State has an interest in the viability of its citizens and
Oan legislate to keep them healthy and self-supporting," said "[tihis logic could lead
to unlimited paternalism." Might not the same be said about Heston?
30 Mill, On Liberty, in THE GREAT LmAL PHILOSOPRERs 380, 383 (C. Morris ed. 1959).
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The individual should be free to act in accordance with his religious be-
liefs in so far as they may coexist with the freedom of others. It is only
when this harmony ceases that the state should derive any interest whicl
will justify interference with the individual's actions.
J.H.M.
